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This paper presents a model of a multinational firm’s optimal debt policy that incorporates 
international taxation factors. The model yields the prediction that a multinational firm’s 
indebtedness in a country depends on a weighted average of national tax rates and differences 
between national and foreign tax rates. These differences matter as multinationals have an 
incentive to shift debt to high-tax countries. The predictions of the model are tested using a 
novel firm-level dataset for European multinationals and their subsidiaries, combined with 
newly collected data on the international tax treatment of dividend and interest streams. Our 
empirical results show that corporate debt policy indeed not only reflects domestic corporate 
tax rates but also differences in international tax systems. These findings contribute to our 
understanding of how corporate debt policy is set in an international context.   
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  -1-1.   Introduction 
 
In most countries, interest expenses are deductible for corporate tax purposes while 
dividends have to be paid out of net-of-tax corporate income. Most tax systems thus favor 
debt finance over equity finance, but to different degrees given the dispersion in top corporate 
tax rates. In determining their financial structure, purely domestic firms only have to deal with 
the domestic tax system. Multinational firms, however, face the more complicated choice of 
determining their overall indebtedness and the allocation of their debts to the parent firm and 
the subsidiaries across all countries in which the multinational operates. As a consequence, 
the financial structure of a multinational firm is expected to reflect the tax systems of all the 
countries where it operates. 
 
  In an international setting, the tax costs of debt and equity finance depend on the 
combined tax systems of the subsidiary and parent countries of the multinational firm. 
Dividends, as indicated, have to be paid out of the subsidiary’s income after subsidiary-
country corporate tax and in addition may be subject to a non-resident dividend withholding 
tax in the subsidiary country. In the parent country, the dividend income may again be subject 
to corporate income tax. If so, double tax relief may or may not be provided for the previously 
paid corporate income and non-resident withholding tax. The tax costs of equity finance thus 
reflect tax rates as well as the double-tax relief convention used by the parent country. This 
paper collects detailed information on all of these aspects of the international tax system for 
European multinationals. 
 
A firm’s financial policies are affected by tax as well as non-tax considerations. A non-
tax consideration is that indebtedness of the overall multinational firm should not be too high to 
keep the probability of costly bankruptcy low. In contrast, an advantage of debt finance is that 
it reduces the free cash flow within the firm and hence can act as a disciplining device for 
otherwise overspending managers. The disciplining properties of debt finance can explain 
generally positive debt levels at each of a multinational’s individual establishments (i.e., its 
parent company and its foreign subsidiaries). These various considerations give rise to an 
optimal overall capital structure for the overall multinational firm for non-tax reasons. 
 
This paper first presents a model of the optimal overall capital structure of the 
multinational firm reflecting tax and non-tax factors. Generally, the tax advantages of debt 
finance lead the firm to choose a higher leverage than would be desirable for purely non-tax 
reasons. At the same time, a change in tax policy optimally causes the firm to rebalance its 
capital structure in all the countries where it operates. Specifically, stronger incentives for 
debt finance in one country encourage debt finance in that country but at the same time 
discourage debt finance in other countries to keep the overall indebtedness of the 
multinational in check. The model yields the result that the optimal debt to assets ratio at any 
establishment of the multinational is positively related to the national tax rate and to 
differences between the national and foreign tax rates. The relevant tax rates in this regard are 
the effective tax rates that take into account any double taxation and double taxation relief. 
International tax rate differences matter, as they determine the incentives to shift debt 
internationally within a multinational firm. 
 
Next, the paper presents evidence on the impact of taxation on firm indebtedness for a 
sample of 33 European countries over the 1994-2003 period using a unique firm-level 
database on the financial structure of domestic and multinational firms, including their parent 
companies and their subsidiaries. For stand-alone domestic firms, we estimate that a 10 
percent increase in the overall tax rate (reflecting corporate income taxes and non-resident 
dividend withholding taxes) increases the ratio of liabilities to assets by 1.84%.  For 
  -2-multinational firms, the leverage ratio is found to be more sensitive to taxation on account of 
international debt shifting. As an example, we can consider a multinational with two equal-
sized establishments in two separate countries. A 10 percent overall tax increase in one 
country is found to increase the leverage ratio in that country by 2.44%, while the leverage 
ratio in the other country decreases by 0.6%. Corporate debt policy appears to reflect local, 
source-level taxes rather than residence-level taxes levied on a multinational’s worldwide 
income, perhaps because these latter taxes can often be deferred. Similarly, debt policy 
appears to reflect corporate income taxation rather than bilateral non-resident dividend 
withholding. In practice, multinationals may be able to avoid bilateral withholding taxes 
through triangular arbitrage involving a conduit company in a third country. 
 
Several authors consider the relationship between firm leverage and taxation with U.S. 
data. Among these, MacKie-Mason (1990) and Gordon and Lee (2001) identify a tax effect 
by exploiting the different effective taxation faced by previously loss-making firms and firms 
of different sizes, respectively. Graham (2000) calculates the value of the tax benefits of debt 
finance for the U.S. case. Using Italian data, Alworth and Arachi (2001) found a positive 
effect for both the corporate and the personal income tax rates on financial leverage. Studies 
that use cross-country data have the advantage that they allow for international variation in 
tax rates. Examples are Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2001). The latter set of authors finds a weak effect on leverage for a tax variable 
that measures the tax shield of debt finance.  Next, there is a set of papers that consider the 
debt finance of multinationals with either parent companies or subsidiaries in the United 
States. Specifically, Hines and Hubbard (1990), Collins and Shackelford (1992), Froot and 
Hines (1992), Grubert (1998) and Altshuler and Grubert (2003) provide evidence that U.S. 
multinational financial structure and the pattern of intra-firm interest and other income flows 
are consistent with tax minimization objectives. Using German data, Ramb and 
Weichenrieder (2004) find that the financial structure of foreign affiliates in Germany are 
partly tax motivated, and Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005) find that a one percentage-point 
increase in the host country's tax rate raises leverage by about .4 percentage-point. Newberry 
and Dhaliwal (2001) find that the debt issuance location of U.S. multinationals is affected by 
these firms’ jurisdiction-specific tax-loss carry-forwards and binding foreign tax credit 
limitations on the value of debt tax shields. Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) find that both the 
internal and external financing of outward U.S. FDI is sensitive to foreign tax rates.  Mills and 
Newberry (2004) analogously find that non-U.S. multinationals from countries with relatively 
low tax rates use relatively intensive debt finance of their foreign controlled corporations in 
the United States. 
 
Jog and Tang (2001) consider the leverage of firms in Canada that may or may not be 
part of U.S.-based or Canadian-based multinationals. The debt-to-assets ratios of Canadian 
corporations without foreign affiliates are found to be more sensitive to Canadian tax rates 
than the debt-to-assets ratios of U.S. controlled corporations located in Canada. Using data for 
member countries of the European Union, Moore and Ruane (2005) examine the leverage of 
8,500 foreign subsidiaries. They find that leverage ratios of these subsidiaries are sensitive to 
the local corporate tax rate, unless the parent country operates a foreign tax credit system. 
This paper nests the approaches of the latter two papers by considering how both 
multinational firm structure and the international tax system affect leverage in Europe. Hence, 
we take into account whether a firm is a parent or a subsidiary of a multinational or a 
domestic firm. At the same time, we account for the tax systems of all the countries where the 
multinational operates. Thus, unlike previous research, our modeling and our empirical work 
take a fully multilateral approach and is the first to study the effect of taxation on leverage in 
a nxn countries context. The main contribution of our paper is to explore in an international 
context the possibility that multinationals set the capital structure of individual subsidiaries by 
  -3-taking into account the tax rate faced by all other subsidiaries of the firm. Our finding that 
subsidiary leverage within a multinational firm responds to bilateral tax rate differences vis-à-
vis both the parent firm and other foreign subsidiaries provides direct support for this 
multilateral approach. 
 
In the remainder, Section 2 describes the international tax treatment of the debt and 
equity finance of multinational firms. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 discusses the 
company-level data. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
2.         The  international  tax  system 
 
This section describes the main features of the corporate income tax system applicable 
to a multinational firm with subsidiaries in one or more foreign countries.
1 To fix ideas, let us 
consider a multinational firm that operates a foreign subsidiary in country i and has the parent 
firm in country p. The deductibility of interest from corporate income implies that there is no 
corporate taxation of interest to external debt holders. Dividends paid by the subsidiary to the 
parent firm in contrast are generally subject to corporate taxation in at least one country. 
 
The subsidiary’s income in county i is first subject to the corporate income tax   in 
this country. Table 1, column (a) indicates the statutory corporate tax rate on corporate profit 
for a sample of 33 European countries in 2003. These tax rates include regional and local 
taxes as well as specific surcharges. Germany has the highest tax rate at 39.6 percent, while 
Cyprus and Lithuania are at the bottom with a tax rate of 15 percent. This and all other tax 
system information in this paper has been collected from the International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation and various websites of national ministries of finance.  For illustrative 
purposes, Tables 1 to 5, we report the figures for the taxation variables for the year 2003. 
i t
 
The subsidiary pays out its after-tax corporate income as a dividend to the parent 
company. The subsidiary country may levy non-resident a withholding tax  on this 
outgoing dividend income. Bilateral dividend withholding taxes in Europe for 2003 are 
presented in Table 2. These rates are zero in the majority – but not in all – of cases. 
Specifically, they are zero among long-standing EU member states on account of the Parent-
subsidiary directive. New EU member states such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovenia still maintain non-zero dividend withholding taxes vis-à-vis considerable 
numbers of European countries. Non-EU member states such as Bulgaria, Romania, Russia 
and Turkey similarly maintain non-zero dividend withholding taxes in a considerable number 
of cases. The combined corporate and withholding tax rate in the subsidiary country is seen to 
be  or   +   -  . 
e
i w
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The parent country subsequently may or may not use its right to tax the income 
generated abroad. In case the parent country operates a territorial or source-based tax system, 
it effectively exempts foreign-source income from taxation. The effective marginal tax on 
income reported in country i, denoted τi, in this instance equals combined corporate and 
                                                 
1 It is reasonable to assume that multinationals do not take into account the taxation of dividend, interest and 
capital gains at the investor level. First, important institutional investors such as pension funds may not be 
subject to taxation of the investor level. Second, private investors generally are subject to such taxation, but the 
internationally dispersed ownership of the shares of a multinational firm makes it difficult for these firms to take 
taxation at the personal level into account when deciding on their financing. 
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  2 Alternatively, the parent country operates a 
worldwide or residence-based tax system. In this instance, the parent country subjects income 
reported in country i to taxation, but it generally provides a foreign tax credit for taxes already 
paid in country i to reduce the potential for double taxation. The OECD model treaty, which 
summarizes recommended practice, in fact gives countries an option between an exemption 
and a foreign tax credit as the only two ways to relieve double taxation (see OECD, 1997). 
The foreign tax credit reduces domestic taxes on foreign source income one-for-one with the 
taxes already paid abroad. The foreign tax credit can be indirect in the sense that it applies to 
both the dividend withholding tax and the underlying subsidiary country corporate income 
tax. Alternatively, the foreign tax credit is direct and applies only to the withholding tax. In 
either case, foreign tax credits in practice are limited to prevent the domestic tax liability on 
foreign source income from becoming negative. 
 
In the indirect credit regime, the multinational will effectively pay no additional tax in 
the parent country, if the parent tax rate tp is less than   The multinational then 
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i, then equals the parent country tax rate, tp. To summarize, with the 
indirect credit system the effective rate on income generated in country i, τi, is given by max 
[ ]. In case of a direct foreign tax credit, the multinational analogously pays no 
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p exceeds  , the firm instead pays tax in the parent country at a rate 
equal to  . The effective, two-country tax rate, τ
e
i w
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e
i p i w t t − − i, with the direct credit system 
is now given by  . A few countries with worldwide taxation do not 
provide foreign tax credits, but instead allow foreign taxes to be deducted from the 
multinational’s taxable income. Under this deduction method, foreign taxes are essentially 
seen as a tax-deductible cost of seeing business at par with other business costs. In the 
scenario, the effective rate of taxation on dividends, , is given by 
] , max[ ) 1 (
e
i p i i w t t t − +
i τ () ( )( ) p
e
i i t w t − − − − 1 1 1 1 . 
 
Columns (b) and (c) of Table 1 provide information on the double taxation rules 
applied to incoming dividend. As reflected in the table, several countries are seen to 
discriminate between international tax treaty partners and non-treaty countries. Finland and 
Spain, for instance, exempt dividend income from treaty partners, while they provide a direct 
and indirect foreign tax credit in case of non-treaty counties, respectively. Note that signing a 
tax treaty makes the granted double tax relief more generous in these instances. The tendency 
to discriminate double tax relief on the basis of the existence of a tax treaty makes it necessary 
to know whether a bilateral tax treaty is indeed effective. Table 3 indicates with a binary 
variable whether any two countries had a tax-treaty in force by 2003.
3 Across the categories 
of treaty and non-treaty countries, the exemption system is seen to be the most common 
                                                 
2  Note that for the parent firm we have that the effective tax rate on corporate income equals the statutory rate, 
or  .   p p t = τ
3  Most of the 33 countries in our sample had such treaties with each other. However, the treaty network of some 
countries – in particular some of the new EU member states and some non-EU countries – are far from complete. 
In contrast, France, Germany, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom have a double-tax treaty in 
force with all other countries. Note that the table is not exactly symmetric because the entry into force may 
slightly differ in each of the two treaty partners. 
  -5-method of double tax relief, followed by foreign tax credits. At the same time, indirect foreign 
tax credits regimes are somewhat more common than direct foreign tax credits. As an 
exceptional case, the Czech Republic is seen to apply the deduction method to foreign 
dividends from non-treaty countries, while Russia and Slovak Republic provide no double tax 
relief at all to such income. 
 
In practice, multinationals use equity as well as internal debt to provide own resources 
to their foreign subsidiaries. Thus, leverage is likely to be affected by the taxation of 
dividends, as considered so far, and by the taxation of interest on internal debt. To reflect this 
in our empirical work, we use a variable ϕi to denote the effective tax rate on cross-border 
dividends, i.e.  , minus an analogous effective rate of tax on interest. Interest on internal 
debt is generally deductible from taxable corporate income in the subsidiary country. Such 
interest income thus escapes corporate income tax in the subsidiary country. As in the case of 
dividends, cross-border interest flows within the multinational firm may generally be subject 
to a non-resident withholding tax in the subsidiary country. Let   denote the bilateral non-
resident interest withholding tax. As seen in Table 4, these tax rates are mostly zero on a 
bilateral basis for the countries in our sample, even if Belgium, Estonia, Latvia, Portugal and 
Romania continue to impose positive interest withholding taxes vis-à-vis almost all countries 
in our sample. As applied to internal interest flows, the parent country has three main options 
regarding double tax relief: (i) an exemption, (ii) a foreign tax credit, or (iii) a deduction. 
Table 5 provides information on the double taxation rules applicable to incoming interest 
from treaty and non-treaty signatory countries, respectively. The signing of a tax treaty, if 
anything, makes the double tax relief in case of interest flows more generous. Foreign-source 
interest flows are seen to benefit from a foreign tax credit in most countries, particularly in the 
case of interest payments originating from treaty partners. Clearly, the taxation of dividend 




i, depends on the possibly different tax relief granted for 
dividends and for interest. Expressions for ϕi in the various possible combinations of double 
tax relief granted for dividend and interest income are provided in Table 6. 
   
3.   The model 
 
The model considers a multinational that generally operates in n countries. The 
multinational is domiciled in country p, while it has foreign subsidiaries in one or more 
countries i with assets A i.. The subsidiary is financed with debt Li, which for now we take to 
be external debt, and equity Ei. Hence, the balance sheet identity of a subsidiary implies Ai = 
Li + Ei. The parent firm fully owns each subsidiary’s equity Ei. In addition, the parent firm 
owns ‘outside’ assets Ap. The parent firm in turn can be financed through either debt Lp or 
equity Ep. Thus, the balance sheet identity for the parent can be stated as .   p p
n
p i
i p E L E A + = +∑
≠



















1 λ . 
Alternatively, we can write f λ as the asset-weighted average of the establishment-specific debt 

















ρ  are the assets of establishment i as a share of the 
  -6-firm’s total assets. Throughout, we will assume that the assets Ai of subsidiary i and the parent 
firm’s ‘outside’ assets Ap given.
4
 
In deciding its financial structure, the multinational firm takes taxation as well as non-
tax factors into account.
5 To start with the latter, the multinational recognizes that higher 
leverage increases the chance of bankruptcy. We will assume that the parent firm provides 
credit guarantees for the debts of all its subsidiaries. This implies that the chance of 
bankruptcy of the overall multinational firm depends on the firm-wide leverage ratio f λ . 
Specifically, we will assume that expected bankruptcy costs,  , of the firm are quadratic in 
the overall leverage ratio
f C
f λ  and proportional to the firm’s overall outside assets as follows
6
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Next, it is recognized that leverage may bring benefits in that it disciplines local 
managers and aligns their incentives more closely to those of the firm. High leverage at a 
subsidiary may, for instance, serve to prevent local managers from overspending on perks for 
themselves to prevent de jure bankruptcy of the subsidiary. On the other hand, high leverage 
may have the disadvantage of making local managers too risk-averse to the point where they 
do not make appropriate local investment decisions.  In either case, the incentive effects of 
leverage are assumed to stem from the local leverage ratio i λ  for establishment i.
  7 On the 
basis of these incentive considerations alone, let λ
* be the optimal leverage ratio at each of the 
multinational’s establishments. Deviations of the leverage ratio at any establishment from the 
level λ
* are assumed to imply incentive-related costs to the firm.  These costs are assumed to 
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Note that these cost functions are scaled to equal zero if the debt ratios i λ  are zero, 
which implies that Ci can be of either sign. Next, let Vl and Vu be the values of the levered and 
completely unlevered multinational firm, respectively. The two are different on account of the 
tax benefits of debt finance and of the (net) non-tax costs associated with debt finance.   
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τ       ( 3 )  
 
                                                 
4 In response to a change in Ei, the parent firm thus will change either Lp or Ep rather than Ap.  
5 See Hovakimian, Hovakimian and Tehranian (2004) for a recent discussion of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on target capital structures reflecting various costs and benefits of debt and equity. 
6 Bankruptcy costs are incurred by loss-making firms and hence are assumed not to be deductible from taxable 
corporate income. 
7 Higher local leverage may be disadvantageous if it increases the probability of losses that cannot be credited 
against profits made elsewhere in the firm. Losses that are not creditable per definition reduce the after-
corporate-tax income of the firm one-for-one. For this reason, we assume that the costs associated with higher 
leverage at the establishment level are not deductible from taxable corporate income. 
  -7-where again is the rate of taxation of dividend income relative to interest income in locale i 
taking into account the overall international tax system. 
i τ
 
The multinational firm’s objective is to maximize its overall firm value   in the 
leveraged state. Its instruments are the debt levels L
L V
i at each establishment.
8 The first order 
conditions w.r.t. Li – written in terms of leverage ratios - are given by 
  
0 ) (
* = − − − λ λ μ γλ τ i f i     i=1,…, n                       (4) 
  
The first order conditions jointly allow us to solve for the optimal value of  i λ  as 
follows: 
i i τ β λ β λ 1
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In expression (5), the term is the optimal leverage ratio at all establishments on 
the basis of all non-tax considerations, or equivalently if all the
*
0λ β
τ ’s are equal to zero. The 
term can be seen to balance the expected costs of bankruptcy (with a value of 
*
0λ β λ  above 
zero) against the costs of deviating from the optimal value of the leverage ratio   on the 
basis of incentive considerations. Expression (5) further contains two tax-related terms. First, 
the term 
* λ
i τ β1 reflects the impact of taxation on the optimal leverage ratio that would obtain 
for a purely domestic firm located in country i. For this reason, this term is dubbed the 
‘domestic’ effect of taxation on leverage. Second, the term reflects the 
impact of international tax rate differences on the optimal leverage in country i on account of 
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j i τ τ −  by the asset shares j ρ . This reflects that the cost function   implies that it is 
relatively painless to shift (absolute) debt into or out of country j, if the assets in this country 
are relatively large. This second effect of taxation on leverage in country i is named the 
‘international’ or ‘debt-shifting’ effect. Note that leverage 
i C
i λ  in country i is negatively related 
to  j τ  on account of the ‘debt-shifting’ effect. 
 












− + + = ∑
≠
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where αi is a country-specific fixed effect and  i ε is an error term. In the benchmark case, the 
sample will consist of observations for all subsidiaries to the exclusion of parent firms.
9 In 
                                                 
8 The firm recognizes all subsidiary and parent firm balance sheet identities, which means that the Ei are co-
determined. 
  -8-practice, a range of firm-level and country-level control variables is included in the 
estimation. 
 
4.   The data 
 
The data on multinational firms are taken from the Amadeus database compiled by 
Bureau Van Dijk.
10 This database provides accounting data on private and publicly owned 
European firms as well as on their ownership relationships. These ownership data allow us to 
match European firms with their domestic subsidiaries and subsidiaries located in other 
European firms. A firm is defined to be a subsidiary, if at least 50 percent of the shares are 
owned by another single firm. A multinational firm has at least one foreign subsidiary. 
Multinational firms tend to provide consolidated and unconsolidated accounting statements. 
Consolidated statements reflect the activities within the parent companies themselves and of 
all domestic and foreign subsidiaries. Non-consolidated statements in contrast reflect the 
activities directly within the parent firm and in each of its subsidiaries. The data we use on 
parent firms and subsidiaries are based on non-consolidated statements. 
 
Information on the number of parent companies and subsidiaries - domestic and 
foreign in our data set – is provided in Panel A of Table 7. The total number of parent 
companies is 5,791, while the total number of subsidiaries is 13,307. We have up to 10 years 
of data for each parent company and subsidiary for a total of 38,736 parent-year observations 
and 90,599 subsidiary-year observations. Note that Amadeus only provides information on 
subsidiaries located in one of the European countries listed in the table.
11 France, Spain and 
the United Kingdom each are home to at least 4,000 parent companies in the data set. Each 
subsidiary has a home country (i.e. the country of its parent company) and a host country 
where the subsidiary is located (therefore, for domestic subsidiaries, home and host countries 
are the same). For each country, the table lists the number of subsidiaries by home country 
and by home country. The table reveals that, for instance, Germany and the Netherlands are 
the home country to relatively many subsidiaries. Hence, there are relatively many 
subsidiaries with a parent firm in one of these countries. Croatia, the Czech Republic and 
Romania instead are the host country to relatively many subsidiaries. 
 
Panel B of Table 7 provides information on financial leverage and applicable tax rates. 
First, financial leverage is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (see the 
Appendix for variable definitions and data sources). Adjusted financial leverage, instead, is 
the ratio of, in the numerator, total liabilities minus accounts payable minus cash to, in the 
denominator, total assets minus accounts payable minus cash. These adjustments reflect that 
accounts payable are liabilities that reflect current operations rather than efforts to optimize 
the firm’s capital structure. Similarly, the subtraction of cash reflects that cash may be on 
hand to pay off existing debts. In Panel B of Table 7, we see that the average parent company 
financial leverage of 0.62 indeed exceeds the average adjusted financial leverage of 0.49. 
                                                                                                                                                          
9 In this instance, the country fixed effect in part can serve to reflect so-called thin capitalization rules that may 
limit the tax benefits (in terms of interest deductibility) associated with subsidiary indebtedness.  
10 The database is created by collecting standardized data received from 50 vendors across Europe. The local 
source for this data is generally the office of the Registrar of Companies. 
11 The Amadeus database only contains information on European firms and we therefore only cover the 
European operations of the multinationals in our sample. We can therefore not consider how tax differences 
between European countries and other parts of the world affect the capital structure of subsidiaries in Europe. 
While this is an important caveat to be mentioned, we do not see this as a major limitation of our analysis 
because European multinationals typically derive much of their revenues from operations in Europe rather than 
other parts of the world. 
  -9-Average financial leverage ranges from 0.36 for Russia and Slovenia to 0.80 for Romania. 
Interestingly, subsidiaries by host country have average financial leverage and adjusted 
financial leverage of 0.62 and 0.49, respectively – exactly equal to the averages for parent 
firms. Hence, there is no tendency for subsidiaries to be either more or less leveraged than 
parent firms. Next, the effective tax rate for subsidiaries by host country is seen to be highest 
for Germany at 0.49, and lowest for Estonia at 0.14. As discussed before, the effective tax 
reflects the taxation of dividends in the host country itself as well as the tax treatment of this 
income in any foreign parent country. The tax incentive to shift debt for subsidiaries by host 
country is the asset-weighted difference of the effective tax rate in the host country and the 
effective tax rates applicable to other establishments of the same multinational firm. A 
positive value of this variable indicates that multinationals on average have an incentive to 
shift debt out of a particular host country. By this measure, subsidiaries hosted in Iceland and 
Germany have the largest incentive to attract debt, while subsidiaries located in Estonia and 
Hungary have the largest incentive to shift debt away. 
 
Panel C of Table 7 provides summary statistics of our leverage and tax variables as 
well as of control variables included in the subsequent estimation. The control variables are 
several firm-level variables derived from the firm’s balance sheet or income statement as well 
as some country variables. Among the firm-level variables, tangibility is defined as the ratio 
of fixed assets to total assets. This variable captures that it may be relatively easy to borrow 
against fixed assets. In addition, depreciable assets may act as a non-debt tax shield and is 
therefore a substitute for debt in taxable profit minimization strategies. Next, log of sales is 
the logarithm of sales. This is a scaling variable to reflect that larger firms may have easier 
access to credit. Next, profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation 
and amortization to total assets. Profitability may affect leverage in several ways. Profitable 
firms may be perceived to be relatively riskless, which would facilitate their access to credit. 
On the other hand, profitable firms may use their profits to pay down their debts or 
alternatively to finance investments through retained earnings. In either way, high profitability 
may lead to a low leverage. Among the country variables, creditor rights is an annual index of 
creditor rights in a country. Well-protected creditor rights are expected to encourage leverage. 
Next, political risk is an annual index of political risks. High political risks may encourage 
borrowing from local creditors, as this is a way to reduce a multinational’s value at risk in a 
country. Inflation is the annual percentage change in the consumer price index. High inflation 
increases the value of the tax deductibility of interest to the extent that inflation leads to 
higher nominal interest rates. At the same time, an inflationary environment may also lead to 
a higher risk premium as part of the nominal interest rate, which discourages debt finance. 
Finally, the growth opportunities variable measures the median annual growth rate of sales in 
an industry in a particular country. Growth opportunities signal future profitability and 
possibly an ability to borrow. 
 
5. Empirical  results 
 
Table 8 presents our basic regressions. The sample consists of all European 
subsidiaries in Amadeus. For each observation, an effective tax rate and a debt shifting 
incentive variable can be constructed. All regressions in the table provide for parent, industry 
and year fixed effects. Regression (1) includes the effective tax rate to the exclusion of the 
international debt shifting incentive variable. The pertinent coefficient is estimated to be 
0.259 and statistically significant.
12 The tangibility variable has a negative coefficient, which 
suggests that debt and tangible, depreciable assets are substitutes. The log of sales enters 
                                                 
12 Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) similarly find a coefficient of 0.2624 in their regression (1) in Table II where 
they regress leverage ratios of U.S. outward FDI on the source country tax rate. 
  -10-positively. Profitability, in turn, obtains a negative coefficient, which suggests that the overall 
effect of higher profitability is to reduce leverage. Note that the 71,355 observations in the 
sample are associated with a total of 5,566 parent companies. Yearly observations of the same 
subsidiary are counted separately. 
 
Regression (2) includes the debt shifting incentive variable. The estimated coefficient 
for this variable is positive and statistically significant, which confirms that leverage at any 
subsidiary of a multinational reflects the overall international tax system faced by the 
multinational. Next, regression (3) includes a set of additional, country-level controls. The 
creditor rights variable enters the regression positively and significantly. The political risk 
variable is equally positively and significantly related to leverage. As indicated, this may 
reflect that political risks lead a multinational to increase local borrowing in order to reduce 
its own capital at risk. Next, inflation has a negative and significant impact on leverage. This 
could reflect that in an inflationary environment there is more uncertainty about the ex post 
real interest rate to be paid on nominal debt denominated in the local currency. Finally, the 
growth opportunities variable enters the regression positively and significantly. High growth 
at the industry and country level may facilitate debt finance of the affected subsidiaries. 
Finally, in regression (4) adjusted financial leverage is taken to be the dependent variable. In 
other respects, regression (4) mimics regression (3). The effective tax rate and debt shifting 
incentive variables continue to obtain positive and significant coefficients, albeit somewhat 
larger than before. Hence the adjustment of financial leverage for accounts payable and cash 
has little impact on the estimated impact of taxation on leverage. In regression (4), however, 
the tangibility variability enters with a positive coefficient to suggest that debt and tangible 
assets are complements (as firms can relatively easily borrow against tangible assets), while 
the political risk and growth opportunities variables cease to obtain significant coefficients. 
 
The estimated coefficients of regression (3) can serve to evaluate the size of the effect 
of taxation on leverage. First, the estimated size of β1, 0.18, indicates the full effect of 
domestic taxation on the leverage of firms. Specifically, the ‘domestic’ effect of an increase in 
the effective tax rate by 0.06 (or one standard deviation) on leverage is 1.1 percent. Next, the 
estimated size of β2, 0.12, captures the ‘international debt-shifting’ effect of taxation on 
leverage. As an example, we can take a hypothetical multinational firm that has a single 
foreign subsidiary with assets of equal size to those of the parent firm. In this instance, an 
increase of the effective tax rate by 0.06 in the subsidiary country has a positive 
‘international’ effect on leverage in the subsidiary country of 0.4 percent. The total effect of 
an increase of the effective tax rate by 0.06 on subsidiary leverage is now calculated to be 1.5 
percent. In contrast, an increase in the effective tax in the parent country of 0.06 has a 
negative ‘international’ effect on leverage in the subsidiary of –1.5 percent. 
 
Next, Table 9 presents some robustness checks, taking regression (3) in Table 8 as a 
starting point. In regression (1), we correct standard errors for clustering across country-
industry observations. The estimated coefficients for the two tax variables are virtually 
unchanged from those of the benchmark regression. Regression (2) in turn limits the sample 
to subsidiaries in the manufacturing sector. In this regression, the estimated sizes of β1 and β2 
are somewhat smaller, and much larger, respectively. The relatively large size of β2 in 
regression (2) may reflect that manufacturing firms are relatively transparent. Hence, for these 
firms it may be relatively easy to borrow in one country against the assets located in other 
countries to explain that leverage in one country is relatively sensitive to international tax rate 
differences. Next, regression (3) limits the sample to foreign subsidiaries. This reduces the 
sample size to 23,296 subsidiaries rather than 49,248 in regression (3) in Table 8. Relative to 
the benchmark regression, the value of β2 is very similar in magnitude at 0.138. In regression 
(4) we restrict the sample to subsidiaries of multinationals, i.e. of firms that have at least one 
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In regression (5) we exclude loss-making subsidiaries by dropping firms that have negative 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. The reason for excluding loss-
making firms is that these firms may be close to financial distress, which could alter their debt 
policy. The results are not qualitatively affected. In regression (6), we exclude Eastern 
European countries from the sample, as the coverage of subsidiaries in Eastern Europe is quite 
poor. This reduces the sample size to 48,444 subsidiaries, but does not alter our main results. 
Financial leverage can also be affected by firm-specific risk. In particular, riskier firms tend to 
be higher levered. In regression (7), we use the standard deviation of the firm’s ratio of 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets over 
the period 1994-2003 as a proxy for the riskiness of the firm. Consistent with capital structure 
theory, we find that financial leverage is positively correlated with risk. Controlling for risk, 
however, does not much alter the effect of our tax variables on leverage. We continue to find 
positive and statistically significant coefficients for β1 and β2, of about equal size as before. In 
regression (8), we control for financial development using the ratio of private credit to GDP 
rather than the index of creditor rights. While private credit to GDP does not enter 
significantly, unlike creditor rights did in previous regressions, our main results are not 
affected. 
 
Finally, Table 10 reports several robustness checks where we alter the taxation 
variables. In regression (1) of Table 10, we control for the relative taxation of equity and 
internal debt of subsidiaries, or  i ϕ . We construct  i ϕ  using information on corporate tax rates 
in the parent and subsidiary countries, withholding taxes on dividend and interest payments in 
the subsidiary country, and double tax relief conventions applied by the parent country to 
incoming dividend and interest payments. We find that  i ϕ  does not enter significantly, and 
that our main results are not affected after controlling for the relative taxation of equity and 
internal debt of subsidiaries. 
 
In regression (2), we include “intermediate” companies, i.e., subsidiaries that are also 
parent companies of other subsidiaries, in the sample.  This increases the sample from 49,248 
to 57,409 observations. Our main results on the effect of taxation on financial leverage are 
unaffected, but we no longer find an effect of political risk on financial leverage. 
 
In regression (3), we assess whether there is a differential effect of our tax variables on 
leverage for intermediate companies and pure subsidiaries (i.e., subsidiaries that are not 
themselves parent companies). We find a negative coefficient for an included intermediate 
firm dummy variable, while the leverage of intermediate firms tends to respond relatively 
strongly to changes in the effective marginal tax rate. A heightened role for taxation to affect 
the leverage of intermediate firms is to be expected, if these firms are important in the overall 
tax planning of the firm. The tax incentive to shift debt abroad, however, is found to affect the 
leverage of intermediate and pure subsidiaries similarly. 
 
In regression (4), we split the tax incentive to shift debt variable in one component that 
captures the incentive to shift debt to the parent country and another component that captures 
the incentive to shift debt to subsidiaries in other countries than the host and parent countries. 
Interestingly, we find that on average the incentives to shift debt to the parent country and to 
other countries both matter, although leverage appears to be more sensitive to the tax 
incentive to shift debt to other countries. These results imply that multinational firms not only 
consider tax-motivated debt shifting opportunities between a foreign subsidiary and the parent 
country, but also among the various foreign subsidiaries. This finding supports our thesis that 
multilateral - rather than bilateral - differences in tax rates determine the financial structure of 
multinational firms. 
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In regression (5), we split the effective tax rate variable in one part that captures the 
taxation in the source country (to be found by setting the tax rate of the parent country to 
zero) and the complement that captures the taxation in the resident country. Parent country 
taxes should matter relatively little to the extent that multinationals are able to defer parent 
country taxes on foreign-source income unless this income is repatriated to the parent country. 
We find that the source-country part of the effective tax rate has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on leverage, while the parent-country part obtains a negative and 
insignificant coefficient perhaps reflecting the option of deferral. 
 
In regression (6), we split the two tax variables into parts that exclude and are 
specifically due to non-resident dividend withholding taxes. The first part is obtained by 
setting all withholding taxes to zero. The second part is obtained as the difference between 
our regular tax rate variables and the tax variables excluding withholding taxes. Interestingly, 
only the tax variables exclusive of withholding taxes are estimated with positive and 
significant coefficients. This suggests that withholding taxes are not seen as part of the 
effective tax burden, possibly because they can be avoided by triangular arbitrage involving a 
conduit company in a tax haven. 
 
We are concerned about potential endogeneity that arises, if countries respond to 
pervasive debt shifting by changing their tax regimes (although tax regimes reflect a host of 
other factors as well). As larger countries tend to have higher tax rates, we use the populations 
of the subsidiary and parent countries as instruments in the construction of the effective tax 
rate variable. Specifically, we re-compute the effective tax rate using the populations of the 
subsidiary and the parent countries instead of these countries’ tax rates, taking into account 
possible double tax relief and assuming withholding taxes are zero. Because we do not have 
separate instruments for the tax incentive to shift debt variable, we only include the effective 
tax rate in this robustness check. The results for this instrumental variables regression are very 
similar. The coefficient on the effective tax rate variable is statistically significant and of 
similar magnitude as in previous regressions. An F-test of the excluded instruments supports 
the choice of our instruments. The first-stage results (not reported) indicate that effective tax 
rates tend to be higher in more populous countries. 
 
6.   Conclusions 
 
This paper has considered the sensitivity of the capital structure of multinational firms 
to taxation. Generally this capital structure depends on the national or international structure 
of the firm and on the tax systems of all the countries where a firm operates. On the basis of a 
large sample of European firms over the 1994-2003 period, we find that a firm’s leverage 
depends on national tax rates as well as international tax rate differences. The relationship 
between leverage and international tax rates differences reflects the presence of international 
debt shifting. While statistically highly significant, both the ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ 
effects of taxation on leverage are rather small. 
 
International debt shifting is shown to reflect a subsidiary’s tax rates differences vis-à-
vis the parent firm as well as vis-à-vis other foreign subsidiaries. This finding confirms our 
premise that international debt shifting reflects the tax regimes of all the countries where the 
multinational operates rather then just bilateral tax rate differences vis-à-vis the parent firm. 
In practice, source-level taxation appears to be more important in affecting leverage than the 
residence-level taxation levied by a multinational’s parent country. This finding may reflect 
that parent-country taxes on a multinational’s foreign source income in practice can be 
deferred, in some cases indefinitely. At the same time, corporate tax rates rather than non-
  -13-resident dividend withholding tax rates appear to matter for leverage. This could reflect that 
multinationals are able to avoid bilateral nonresident dividend withholding taxes by using 
conduit companies in third countries. 
 
International debt shifting serves to lower average levels of corporate income taxation 
in high-tax countries. Countries with relatively low rates of taxation may benefit from 
international debt shifting, as local establishments of multinational firms will be less highly 
leveraged than they would otherwise be – resulting in higher corporate income tax revenues. 
Overall, international debt shifting may introduce some dead-weight losses in the form of 
implementation costs for the multinational firms and also costs inherent in deviations from the 
firm’s optimal financial structure on the basis of non-tax considerations. An obvious way to 
eliminate international debt shifting is to harmonize top corporate income tax rates 
internationally. Alternatively, international debt shifting is moot in case countries introduce a 
common, consolidated tax base for multinational firms. Tax coordination of either kind is not 
very likely in the near future so that international debt shifting will remain an important policy 
for multinationals worldwide. 
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Statutory corporate tax 
rate 
including local taxes and 
surcharges (%) 
Treatment of foreign 
dividends from treaty 
countries 
Treatment of foreign 
dividends from non-treaty 
countries 
Austria 34  Exemption  Exemption 
Belgium  33.99  95% exemption  95% exemption 
Bulgaria 23.5  Indirect  credit  Direct  credit 
Croatia 20  Exemption  Exemption 
Cyprus 15  Exemption  Exemption 
Czech Republic  31  Indirect credit  Deduction 
Denmark 30  Exemption  Exemption 
Estonia 26
14 Indirect credit  Indirect credit 
Finland 29  Exemption  Direct  credit 
France 35.43
15 95% exemption  95% exemption 
Germany 39.59
16 95% exemption  95% exemption 
Greece  35  Indirect credit  Indirect credit 
Hungary 19.64
17 Exemption Exemption 
Iceland 18  Exemption  Exemption 
Ireland 12.5
18 Indirect credit  Indirect credit 
                                                 
13 We only show the data for the year 2003 but have collected data on tax rates for each year in our sample period. The complete dataset on the international tax data collected 
is available upon request from the authors. 
14  Zero percent on retained earnings. A distribution tax of 26% is applied on distributed profit. 
15  Including a 3% social surcharge and a special 3.3% surcharge for large companies. 
16  Including a solidarity surcharge of 5.5% and an average deductible trade tax of 16.14%. It also includes the exceptional 1.5% additional tax in 2003.  
17  Including a deductible local business tax. 
18  The rate is 25% for non-trading activities. 
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Statutory corporate tax 
rate 
including local taxes and 
surcharges (%) 
Treatment of foreign 
dividends from treaty 
countries 
Treatment of foreign 
dividends from non-treaty 
countries 
Italy  38.25  60% Exemption  60% Exemption 
Latvia 19  Exemption  Exemption 
Lithuania 15  Exemption  Exemption 
Luxembourg 30.38
19 Exemption Exemption 
Malta  35  Indirect credit  Indirect credit 
Netherlands 34.5  Exemption  Exemption 
Norway  28  Indirect credit  Indirect credit 
Poland 27  Indirect  credit
20 Direct Credit 
Portugal 33  Direct  credit
21 Direct credit 
Romania 25  Indirect  credit Indirect  credit 
Russia 24  Direct  credit  No  relief 
Slovak Republic  25  Indirect credit  No relief 
Slovenia 25  Exemption  Exemption 
Spain 35  Exemption  Indirect  credit 
Sweden 28  Exemption  Exemption 
Switzerland 21.74
22 Exemption Exemption 
Turkey 33  Indirect  credit  Direct  credit 
United Kingdom  30  Indirect credit Indirect  credit 
Note : Dividends are assumed to be paid by fully owned subsidiaries. Source : International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation. 
 
                                                 
19  Including employment surcharge and local taxes. 
20  Indirect tax credit if holding 75% for two years and treaty and where the EU Parent-subsidiary directive holds. 
21  Exemption if EU Parent-Subsidiary directive applies (but foreign withholding tax is not creditable). 
22  Including cantonal and local taxes in Zurich. 
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Table 2.  Bilateral withholding tax on dividend payments between fully owned foreign subsidiary and parent on 1
st January 2003. 
 
2003 OE BE BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE GR HU IC IE IT LV LT LU MT NL NO PL PT RO RU SK SI ES SE CH TR GB
Austria X000 1 0 1 0 050000 1 0 2 5 00 2 5 2 5 0 1 5 05 1 0 0 1 5 5 1 0 5000 2 5 0
Belgium 0 X 10 10 10 5 0 25 0 0 0 0 10 25 0 0 25 25 0 15 0 5 10 0 5 10 5 5 0 0 10 15 0
Bulgaria 0 10 X 5 5 10 5 15 10 5 15 10 10 15 5 10 15 15 5 0 5 15 10 10 10 15 10 15 5 10 5 10 10
Croatia 01 05 X1 05 51 55 5 0 5 51 5 1 5 1 051 5 1 55 51 551 55 5 51 551 551 05
Cyprus 0000X0000000000000000000000000000
Czech Rep. 10 5 10 5 10 X 15 5 5 10 5 15 5 5 5 15 5 5 5 5 0 5 5 10 10 10 5 5 5 0 5 15 5
Denmark 0055 1 0 1 5 X50000500055000000 1 0 1 0 1 5 5000 1 5 0
Estonia 0000000X0000000000000000000000000
Finland 00 1 0 5 2 9 000X0005000000000000005000 1 5 0
France 0055 1 0 1 0 050X00550055050050 1 0 1 0 1 0 5005 1 5 0
Germany 00 1 5 1 5 1 0 50500X0550055050050 1 0 55 1 5 000 1 5 0
Greece 00000000000X000000000000000000000
Hungary 10 10 10 10 5 5 5 20 5 5 5 10 X 20 5 10 20 20 5 5 5 10 10 10 5 10 5 10 5 5 10 10 5
Iceland 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 505055 1 5 1 5 X 1 5 1 5 555 1 5 005 1 0 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 505 1 5 5
Ireland 000 2 0 0000000 2 0 0 2 0 X0000 2 0 00000000000 2 0 0
Italy 00 1 0 1 0 1 5 1 5 050000 1 0 2 7 00 2 7 50 1 5 0 1 5 1 0 0 1 0 5 1 5 1 0 00 1 5 1 5 0
Latvia 1 0 1 0 1 0 5 1 0 555555 1 0 1 0 55 1 0 X0 1 0 5555 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 5 1 0 55 1 0 5
Lithuania 1 5 1 5 1 5 5 1 5 550555 1 5 1 5 5550X 1 5 1 5 555 1 5 1 0 1 5 1 0 5555 1 0 5
Luxembourg 000 2 0 2 0 00 2 0 00000000 2 0 2 0 X000000000000 2 0 0
Malta 0000000000000000000X0000000000000
Netherlands 0050 2 5 005000050005505X000050500050
Norway 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 0505000 2 0 1 0 00 1 5 555 1 5 0X5 1 0 1 0 1 0 5 1 5 1 0 05 2 0 5
Poland 1 0 1 0 1 0 5 1 0 555555 1 5 1 0 50 1 0 555505X 1 0 5 1 0 55555 1 0 5
Portugal 0 0 15 30 30 15 0 30 0 0 0 0 15 15 0 0 30 30 0 15 0 15 15 X 15 15 30 30 0 0 15 30 0
Romania 1 051 051 0 1 0 1 0 1 051 0 1 0 1 051 031 0 1 0 1 05 5 51 051 0X1 0 1 051 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Russia 51 5 1 55 01 0 1 0 1 55 5 51 5 1 0 1 5 1 051 5 1 5 1 0 1 551 0 1 0 1 0 1 5X1 0 1 05 5 51 0 1 0
Slovak Rep. 1 0 5 1 0 5 1 0 5 1 5 1 5 5 1 0 5 1 5 5 1 5 0 1 5 1 0 1 0 55055 1 5 1 0 1 0 X550555
Slovenia 5 5 15 15 10 5 5 15 5 5 15 15 10 15 5 10 5 5 5 15 5 15 5 15 15 10 5 X 5 5 5 15 5
Spain 005 1 5 1 5 50 1 5 00005500 1 5 1 5 0 1 5 0 1 0 505555X0 1 0 1 5 0
Sweden 00000000000000000000000000000X000
Switzerland 5 10 5 35 35 5 0 35 5 5 5 5 10 5 10 15 5 5 0 35 0 5 5 10 10 5 5 15 10 0 X 35 5
Turkey 16,5 16,5 16,5 11 16,5 16,5 16,5 16,5 16,5 16,5 16,5 16,5 11 16,5 16,5 16,5 16,5 11 16,5 16,5 16,5 16,5 11 16,5 16,5 11 5,5 16,5 16,5 16,5 16,5 X 16,5
United Kingdom 00000000000000000000000000000000X  
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Notes  :  (a) The Parent-Subsidiary directive is binding between EU Member States and 
provides exemption from withholding tax when holding is at least 25%.  (b) Ireland: 
companies located in EU or treaty countries are exempt from withholding tax provided that 
they are not under the control of persons not resident in such countries. (c) Estonia: general 
exemption from withholding tax if holding in foreign company is at least 25%. (d) Italy: if the 
recipient can prove a tax is paid in its country on the dividend, the Italian authorities can 
provide a refund equal to the tax claimed limited to 4/9 of the Italian withholding tax. (e) 
Lithuania: general exemption from withholding tax if holding in foreign company is at least 
25%. (f) Luxembourg: exemption from withholding tax for EU and treaty partners if holding 
in foreign company is at least 10%. (g) Sweden: no withholding tax if  holding is 25% and 
there is normal corporate taxation in the foreign country and if the shares are held for 
business-related reasons. Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation. 
 
 Table 3.  Existence of a bilateral tax treaty on January 1
st 2003. 
 


































Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, various ministries’ websites. 
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Table 4.  Bilateral withholding tax on interest payments between fully owned foreign subsidiary and parent on 1
st January  2003 
 
2003 OE BE BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE GR HU IC IE IT LV LT LU MT NL NO PL PT RO RU SK SI ES SE CH TR GB
Austria X00000000000000000000000000000000
Belgium 1 5 X 1 01 51 01 01 51 51 01 51 51 01 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 01 01 51 01 51 01 01 01 01 51 01 01 51 5
Bulgaria 0 10 X 5 7 10 0 15 0 0 0 15 10 15 5 0 15 15 10 0 0 0 10 10 15 15 10 15 0 0 10 10 0
Croatia 5 15 5 X 10 0 0 15 0 0 0 10 0 15 15 10 10 10 15 0 0 0 10 15 10 10 10 15 15 0 5 10 10
Cyprus 0000x0000000000000000000000000000
Czech Rep. 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 X0 1 0 000 1 0 0000 1 0 1 0 0000 1 0 1 0 7005000 1 5 0
Denmark 000000X00000000000000000000000000





Hungary 0 1 5 1 0 0 1 0 00 1 8 000 1 0 X 1 8 00 1 8 1 8 0 1 0 00 1 0 1 0 1 5 00000 1 0 1 0 0
Iceland 0000000000000X0000000000000000000
Ireland 000 2 0 000000000 2 0 X0000 2 0 00000000000 2 0 0
Italy 0000000000000 1 2 , 5 0X 1 2 , 5 0000000000000000
Latvia 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 X 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10





Poland 0 10 10 10 10 10 5 10 0 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 X 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 10 10 0
Portugal 10 15 10 20 20 10 10 20 15 12 15 15 10 10 15 15 20 20 15 10 10 15 10 X 10 10 20 20 15 20 10 20 10
Romania 10 10 10 7,5 10 7 10 10 5 10 10 10 10 10 3 10 10 10 10 5 0 10 10 10 X 10 10 7,5 10 10 10 10 10
Russia 0 15 20 10 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 20 0 20 0 10 20 20 0 20 0 10 10 10 20 X 0 10 5 0 10 10 0
Slovak Rep. 01 0 1 0 1 0 1 00 02 50 0 01 002 50 01 0 1 00 0 0 01 0 2 5 1 00X0 0 01 0 1 00
Slovenia 000000000000000000000000000X00000




United Kingdom 0 15 0 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 10 10 10 0 10 0 0 0 10 10 0 0 10 12 0 0 15 X  
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Notes :  (a) Ireland: interest paid to a 75% non-resident parent is deemed to be a dividend. (b) 
Spain: interest is generally exempt from tax in Spain provided the direct beneficiary is a 
resident in another EU Member State. (c) Estonia: 0% if rate in recipient country is not lower 
than 2/3 of the Estonia tax rate on interest of 26%. (d) Switzerland: no withholding tax on 
ordinary loans, 35% on bonds and deposits. (e)Turkey: exemption for government bonds and 
debentures, as well as loans obtained from foreign companies and institutions, (f) Italy: zero 
withholding tax with treaty countries for public bonds, private bonds, and deposits; 27% with 
non-treaty countries for deposits and private bonds of maturity of less than 18 months; 12.5% 
otherwise. Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation. 
 Table 5.   Double-tax relief systems for interest payments received in selected European countries in 2003 
 
  Interest payments from treaty 
countries 
Interest payments from non-treaty 
countries 
Austria Credit  Credit 
Belgium Credit  Credit 15/85
th
Bulgaria Credit  Credit 
Croatia Credit  Credit 
Cyprus  50% exemption  50% exemption 
Czech Republic  Credit  Deduction 
Denmark Credit  Credit 
Estonia Credit  Deduction 
Finland Credit  Credit 
France Credit  Deduction 
Germany Credit  Credit 
Greece Credit  Credit 
Hungary Credit  Credit 
Iceland Credit  Credit 
Ireland Credit  Credit 
Italy Credit  Credit 
Latvia Credit  Credit 
Lithuania Credit  Credit 
Luxembourg Credit  Credit 
Malta Credit  Credit 
Netherlands Credit  Credit 
Norway Credit  Credit 
Poland Credit  Credit 
Portugal Credit  Credit 
Romania Credit  Credit 
  -24--25-
  Interest payments from treaty 
countries 
Interest payments from non-treaty 
countries 
Russia Credit  Credit 
Slovak Republic  Credit  No relief 
Slovenia Credit  Credit 
Spain Credit  Credit 
Sweden Credit  Credit 
Switzerland Credit  Deduction 
Turkey Credit  Credit 
United Kingdom  Credit  Credit 
Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation. 
 
Table 6.   Expressions for  or the relative taxation of equity and internal debt of subsidiaries.  i ϕ
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 Table 7.  Descriptive Statistics for Subsidiaries of European Multinationals 
 
Panel A lists the number of parent companies and subsidiaries (by home and host country) in 
the sample. Intermediary companies, that are both parent firms and subsidiaries, are counted 
as subsidiaries only. Domestic subsidiaries are counted as subsidiaries by home country only. 
Panel B presents the sample averages of financial leverage and tax variables. Panel C presents 
the summary statistics for the financial leverage, tax, and other variables for subsidiaries only. 
Financial leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Adjusted financial leverage is 
the ratio of total liabilities minus accounts payables minus cash to total assets minus accounts 
payables minus cash. Effective marginal tax rate (τ) is the statutory tax rate on dividend 
income generated in the subsidiary country, taking withholding taxes and the tax system for 
foreign source income into account. Tax incentive to shift debt is the sum of international tax 
differences between subsidiary countries weighted by subsidiary asset shares, taking 
withholding taxes and the international tax system into account. Tangibility is the ratio of 
subsidiary fixed assets to subsidiary total assets. Log of sales is the logarithm of subsidiary 
sales. Profitability is the ratio of subsidiary earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization to subsidiary total assets. Creditor rights is the annual index of credit rights in 
the country from Djankov et al. (2005). Political risk is the annual (December) index of 
political risk from the International Country Risk Guide. We inverted the scale from 0-100 
with higher scores indicating greater risk. Inflation is the annual percentage change in the CPI 
of the subsidiary’s host country from the World Development Indicators. Growth 
opportunities is the median of the annual growth rate of subsidiary sales in a subsidiary’s 
country and industry. Sample consists of parent companies and subsidiaries of European firms 
in Amadeus. We have up to 10 years of data for each parent company and subsidiary. The 
total number of parent-year observations is 38,736, and the total number of subsidiary-year 
observations is 90,599. 
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Panel A:  Number of parent companies and subsidiaries 
 
 
Number of parent 
companies:  Number of subsidiaries: 
Country  by home country  by home country  by host country 
Austria 32  75  67 
Belgium  538 1,168 1,322 
Bulgaria 38  92  13 
Croatia 0  0  25 
Cyprus 0  0  1 
Czech Republic  2  2  58 
Denmark 282  595  493 
Estonia 10  22  33 
Finland 132  307  352 
France  582 1,586 1,313 
Germany 321  974  657 
Greece 163  369  250 
Hungary 11  17  67 
Iceland 22  45  56 
Ireland 56  118  94 
Italy 567  928  954 
Latvia 2  7  11 
Lithuania 5 7  9 
Luxembourg 5  9  21 
Netherlands 429  884  563 
Norway 159  384  623 
Poland 32  50  135 
Portugal 70  127  255 
Romania 2  3  54 
Russia 8  12  5 
Slovak Republic  3  8  4 
Slovenia 17  27 6 
Spain  933 2,071 2,573 
Sweden  595 1,194 1,030 
Switzerland 48  76  59 
United  Kingdom  727 2,150 2,204 
Total 5,791  13,307  13,307 
 Panel B:  Financial leverage and marginal tax rates 
 
  Financial leverage  Adjusted financial leverage 
Effective marginal tax 
rate 




companies:  Subsidiaries: 
Parent 
companies:  Subsidiaries: Subsidiaries:  Subsidiaries: 
Country  by home country  by host country by home country by host country  by host country  by host country 
Austria  0.58 0.61 0.52 0.56  0.34  -0.033 
Belgium 0.66 0.66 0.50 0.51  0.40  0.016 
Bulgaria 0.56 0.42 0.43 0.33  0.30  -0.004 
Croatia   0.48      0.32  -0.006 
Cyprus   0.15  0.06  0.35  0.002 
Czech 
Republic  0.47 0.45 0.27 0.22  0.42  0.004 
Denmark  0.62 0.65 0.54 0.57  0.31  -0.003 
Estonia  0.49 0.50 0.26 0.27  0.14  -0.153 
Finland  0.56 0.55 0.45 0.46  0.29  -0.021 
France  0.60 0.63 0.43 0.46  0.37  0.001 
Germany  0.65 0.66 0.58 0.60  0.49  0.043 
Greece  0.54 0.55 0.38 0.38  0.42  0.036 
Hungary 0.50 0.49 0.40 0.43  0.26  -0.114 
Iceland  0.57 0.63 0.47 0.57  0.43  0.080 
Ireland  0.59 0.58 0.41 0.43  0.26  -0.029 
Italy  0.73 0.70 0.61 0.58  0.45  0.027 
Latvia  0.71 0.62 0.47 0.38  0.33  0.018 
Lithuania  0.60 0.56 0.46 0.32  0.28  -0.003 
Luxembourg  0.68 0.58 0.59 0.48  0.37  -0.007 
Netherlands  0.63 0.63 0.52 0.52  0.35  -0.001 
  -28-Norway 0.63 0.63 0.52 0.51  0.33  -0.004 
Poland  0.56 0.54 0.37 0.40  0.35  -0.009 
Portugal 0.63 0.63 0.54 0.50  0.37  0.005 
Romania  0.80 0.52 0.59 0.37  0.37  -0.002 
Russia  0.36 0.48 0.18 0.17  0.35  0.015 
Slovak 
Republic  0.48 0.48 0.33 0.34  0.42  0.012 
Slovenia 0.36 0.40      0.37  -0.025 
Spain  0.61 0.60 0.45 0.45  0.35  0.000 
Sweden 0.61 0.62 0.51 0.53  0.29  -0.011 
Switzerland  0.52 0.58 0.37 0.49  0.31  -0.027 
United 
Kingdom  0.57 0.62 0.44 0.50  0.31  -0.017 









observations Average  Standard  Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Financial leverage  90,599 0.62 0.21 0.00 1.00
Adjusted financial leverage  86,516 0.49 0.27 0.00 1.00
Effective marginal tax rate  90,599 0.36 0.06 0.00 0.67
Tax incentive to shift debt  66,462 0.00 0.05 -0.49 0.42
Tangibility 90,233 0.38 0.26 0.00 1.00
Log of sales  81,747 10.40 1.93 0.00 18.56
Profitability 74,812 0.11 0.19 -10.13 28.03
Creditor rights  89,945 2.07 1.18 0.00 4.00
Political risk  90,517 16.56 5.86 3.00 57.00
Inflation 90,599 2.64 3.78 -1.18 154.76
Growth opportunities  78,310 0.00 0.42 -7.26 14.00
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Table 8.  The Impact of Domestic and International Taxes on the Financial Leverage of 
Subsidiaries of Multinational Firms 
 
The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is the ratio of subsidiary total liabilities to 
subsidiary total assets. The dependent variable in column (4) is the ratio of total liabilities 
minus accounts payables minus cash to total assets minus accounts payables minus cash. 
Effective marginal tax rate (τ) is the statutory tax rate on dividend income generated in the 
subsidiary country, taking withholding taxes and the tax system for foreign source income 
into account. Tax incentive to shift debt is the sum of international tax differences between 
subsidiary countries weighted by subsidiary asset shares, taking withholding taxes and the 
international tax system into account. Tangibility is the ratio of subsidiary fixed assets to 
subsidiary total assets. Log of sales is the logarithm of subsidiary sales. Profitability is the 
ratio of subsidiary earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization to subsidiary 
total assets. Creditor rights is the annual index of credit rights in the country from Djankov et 
al. (2005). Political risk is the annual (December) index of political risk from International 
Country Risk Guide. We inverted the scale from 0-100 with higher scores indicating greater 
risk. Inflation is the annual percentage change in CPI of the subsidiary’s host country from 
World Development Indicators. Growth opportunities is the median of the annual growth rate 
of subsidiary sales in a subsidiary’s country and industry. Sample consists of subsidiaries of 
European companies in Amadeus. All regressions are estimated using OLS and include 
parent, industry, and year fixed effects. We report White (1980)’s heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors between brackets. * denotes significance at 10%; ** significance at 
5%; and *** significance at 1%. 
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Adjusted financial leverage 
Effective marginal tax rate  0.259***  0.162***  0.184***  0.195*** 
 (0.017)  (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.044) 
Tax incentive to shift debt     0.132***  0.120***  0.178*** 
   (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.045) 
Tangibility -0.130***  -0.123***  -0.120***  0.105*** 
 (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008) 
Log of sales  0.022***  0.023***  0.023***  0.022*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Profitability -0.062**  -0.055**  -0.060*  -0.081* 
 (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.032)  (0.042) 
Creditor rights      0.006***  0.019*** 
     (0.001)  (0.002) 
Political risk      0.001***  -0.000 
     (0.000)  (0.000) 
Inflation     -0.001***  -0.002*** 
     (0.000)  (0.000) 
Growth opportunities      0.021*** 0.010 
     (0.008) (0.009) 
        
Parent, industry, and year fixed 
effects 
Y Y Y  Y 
Number of observations  71,355  52,310  49,248  47,511 
Number of parent companies  5,566  5,118  5,064  5,016 
R-squared 0.08  0.08  0.08  0.05 
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Table 9.  The Impact of Taxes on the Financial Leverage of Subsidiaries of 
Multinational Firms: Robustness Checks 
 
The dependent variable is the ratio of subsidiary total liabilities to subsidiary total assets. 
Effective marginal tax rate (τ) is the statutory tax rate on dividend income generated in the 
subsidiary country, taking withholding taxes and the tax system for foreign source income 
into account. Tax incentive to shift debt is the sum of international tax differences between 
subsidiary countries weighted by subsidiary asset shares, taking withholding taxes and the 
international tax system into account. In column (1), we correct standard errors correct for 
clustering across country-industry observations. In column (2), we only include subsidiaries 
operating in the manufacturing industries. In column (3), we only include the subset of 
foreign subsidiaries. In column (4), we only include subsidiaries of multinational companies. 
In column (5), we exclude subsidiaries with negative earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization. In column (6), we exclude Eastern European countries from 
the sample. In column (7), we include the standard deviation of the firm’s EBITDA over the 
period 1994-2003 as a measure of firm-specific risk. In column (8), we control for financial 
development using the ratio of private credit to GDP rather than the index of creditor rights. 
Tangibility is the ratio of subsidiary fixed assets to subsidiary total assets. Log of sales is the 
logarithm of subsidiary sales. Profitability is the ratio of subsidiary earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization to subsidiary total assets. Creditor rights is the annual 
index of credit rights in the country from Djankov et al. (2005). Political risk is the annual 
(December) index of political risk from the International Country Risk Guide. We inverted 
the scale from 0-100 with higher scores indicating greater risk. Inflation is the annual 
percentage change in the CPI of the subsidiary’s host country from the World Development 
Indicators. Growth opportunities is the median of the annual growth rate of subsidiary sales in 
a subsidiary’s country and industry. Volatility of profits is the standard deviation of the firm’s 
ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets 
over the period 1994-2003. Sample consists of subsidiaries of European companies in 
Amadeus. All regressions are estimated using OLS and include parent, industry, and year 
fixed effects. We report White (1980)’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors between 
brackets. * denotes significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; and *** significance at 1%. 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 












Effective marginal tax rate  0.184***  0.139***  0.241***  0.193***  0.212***  0.180***  0.186***  0.184*** 
  (0.053) (0.046) (0.045) (0.041) (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033) 
Tax incentive to shift debt   0.120***  0.264***  0.138***  0.122***  0.108***  0.090***  0.116***  0.130*** 







-0.115*** -0.115***  -0.113***  -0.119*** -0.119*** 
  (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Log of sales  0.023***  0.019***  0.018***  0.020***  0.021***  0.023***  0.023***  0.023*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Profitability -0.060**  -0.131***  -
0.144*
** 
-0.052 -0.054  -0.058*  -0.069**  -0.060* 
  (0.030) (0.023) (0.015) (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.031)  (0.028)  (0.032) 
Creditor rights  0.006**  0.010***  0.017***  0.007***  0.007***  0.006***  0.006***   
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)   
Political risk  0.001*  0.001**  0.001**  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Inflation -0.001**  -0.002***  -
0.001*
** 
-0.001*** -0.001*** 0.004*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Growth  opportunities  0.021*** 0.014 0.039***  0.029***  0.030***  0.025***  0.021***  0.022*** 
  (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Volatility of profits              0.035***   
          (0.013)   
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Private credit to GDP                -0.000 
            (0.000) 
             
Parent, industry, and year 
fixed effects 
Y Y Y Y Y  Y  Y  Y 
Number of observations  49,248  19,397  23,296  30,187  44,410  48,444  48,512  47,997 
Number of parent 
companies 
5,064 2,416 2,844 2,883 4,882  4,967  4,847  5,105 
R-squared  0.08 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.08  0.08  0.09  0.08 
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Table 10.  The Impact of Taxes on the Financial Leverage of Subsidiaries of 
Multinational Firms: Additional Robustness Checks 
 
The dependent variable is the ratio of subsidiary total liabilities to subsidiary total assets. 
Effective marginal tax rate (τ) is the statutory tax rate on dividend income generated in the 
subsidiary country, taking withholding taxes and the tax system for foreign source income 
into account. Tax incentive to shift debt is the sum of international tax differences between 
subsidiary countries weighted by subsidiary asset shares, taking withholding taxes and the 
international tax system into account.  In column (1), we control for the relative taxation of 
equity and internal debt of subsidiaries (ϕ). In column (2), we include “intermediate” 
companies, i.e., subsidiaries that are also parent companies of other subsidiaries, in the 
sample. In column (3), we assess whether there is a differential effect of our tax variables on 
leverage for intermediate companies and pure subsidiaries. In column (4), we split the tax 
incentive to shift debt variable in one component that captures the incentive to shift debt to 
the parent country and another component that captures the incentive to shift debt to 
subsidiaries in other countries than the host and parent country. In column (5) we split the 
effective marginal tax rate variable in one component that captures the taxation in the source 
country (i.e., by setting the tax rate of the parent to zero) and one component that captures the 
taxation in the resident country. In column (6), we split both tax variables in one component 
that does not depend on withholding taxes and another component that depends on 
withholding taxes. In column (7), we use the population of the subsidiary country and the 
population of the parent country as instruments for the effective marginal tax rate. Taking the 
tax system into account and assuming that withholding taxes are zero. Tangibility is the ratio 
of subsidiary fixed assets to subsidiary total assets. Log of sales is the logarithm of subsidiary 
sales. Profitability is the ratio of subsidiary earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization to subsidiary total assets. Creditor rights is the annual index of credit rights in 
the country from Djankov et al. (2005). Political risk is the annual (December) index of 
political risk from the International Country Risk Guide. We inverted the scale from 0-100 
with higher scores indicating greater risk. Inflation is the annual percentage change in the CPI 
of the subsidiary’s host country from the World Development Indicators. Growth 
opportunities is the median of the annual growth rate of subsidiary sales in a subsidiary’s 
country and industry. Sample consists of subsidiaries of European companies in Amadeus. All 
regressions are estimated using OLS and include parent, industry, and year fixed effects. We 
report White (1980)’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors between brackets. * 
denotes significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; and *** significance at 1%. 


























Effective marginal tax rate  0.184***  0.164***  0.149***  0.178***      0.200*** 
 (0.034)  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.033)      (0.064) 
Tax incentive to shift debt   0.120***  0.149***  0.154***    0.112***     
 (0.044)  (0.030)  (0.031)    (0.033)     
Relative tax of equity and debt  0.001             
 (0.043)             
Intermediate     -0.045**         
     (0.017)         
Intermediate * Effective marginal tax rate      0.090*         
     (0.047)         
Intermediate * Tax incentive to shift debt      -0.065         
     (0.087)         
Tax incentive to shift debt to parent 
country 
     0.086**     
       (0.037)       
Tax incentive to shift debt to other 
countries 
     0.215***     
       (0.065)       
Source effective marginal tax rate          0.188***     
         (0.033)     
Resident effective marginal tax rate          -0.186     
         (0.116)     
Effective marginal tax rate excl. 
withholding taxes 
         0.184***   


























           (0.033)   
Tax incentive to shift debt excl. 
withholding taxes 
         0.133***   
           (0.033)   
Effective marginal tax rate due to 
withholding taxes 
         0.162   
           (0.173)   
Tax incentive to shift debt due to 
withholding taxes 
         -0.115   
           (0.167)   
Tangibility -0.120***  -0.134***  -0.133***  -0.120***  -0.120***  -0.119***  -0.127*** 
 (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.004) 
Log of sales  0.023***  0.022***  0.022***  0.023***  0.023***  0.023***  0.023*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Profitability -0.060*  -0.065**  -0.065**  -0.060*  -0.060*  -0.060*  -0.066*** 
 (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.004) 
Creditor rights  0.006***  0.005***  0.005***  0.006***  0.006***  0.007***  0.007*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Political  risk  0.001***  0.000 0.000 0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Inflation -0.001***  -0.001**  -0.001**  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Growth opportunities  0.021***  0.011*  0.012*  0.022***  0.022***  0.022***  0.012*** 
 (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.005) 


























              
              
F-test of excluded instruments (p-value)              0.000*** 
Parent, industry, and year fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Number of observations  49,248  57,409  57,409  49,248  49,248  49,248  65,120 
Number of parent companies  5,064  5,236  5,236  5,064  5,064  5,064  5,502 
R-squared 0.08  0.09  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.10 
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Variable Definition  Source 
Financial leverage  Ratio of total liabilities to total assets  Amadeus 
Adjusted financial 
leverage 
Ratio of total liabilities minus accounts payable minus cash to 
assets minus accounts payable minus cash 
Amadeus 
Effective marginal tax 
rate 
Statutory tax rate on dividend income taking into account 
withholding taxes and international tax system  
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
and various ministries 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
and various ministries 
Tax incentive to shift 
debt 
Sum of international tax differences weighed by local asset 
shares taking into account withholding taxes and international 
tax system 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
and various ministries 
Relative tax of equity and 
debt 
Statutory tax rate on dividend income minus statutory tax rate 
on interest income taking into account withholding taxes and 
international tax system 
Tangibility  Ratio of fixed assets to total assets  Amadeus 
Log of sales  Logarithm of sales  Amadeus 
Profitability  Ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization to total assets 
Amadeus 
Intermediate  Dummy variable flagging subsidiary firm that is also parent 
firm 
Amadeus 
Creditor rights  Annual index of credit rights in the country  Djankov et al. (2005) 
Political risk  Annual (December) index of political risk. On a scale from 0-
100 with higher scores indicating greater risk 
International Country Risk Guide 
Inflation  Annual percentage change in the CPI   World Development Indicators 
Growth opportunities  Median of the annual growth rate of sales per country and 
industry. 
Amadeus 
Amadeus  Volatility of profits  Standard deviation of the firm’s ratio of earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to 
total assets over the period 1994-2003 
Private credit to GDP  Ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP  World Development Indicators 
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